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International Issues in Common Law
Choice of Law: American Conflicts
Teaching Exits the Middle Ages
Harold G. Maier*
Prologue: A Fact-Based Fantasy
In the year 1274, Sir Hugh LaPape, knight, vassal, and retainer
of his liege lord, Edward the First of England, stood on a hill
outside the city of Florence,Italy, and wept. Fouryears before, Sir
Hugh had set off for the Holy Land at the call of his king,' leaving
behind him a beautiful palace with tall towers, shining in the
morning sun. Now he surveyed the remains of thatpalace, a pile of
rubble, in growing anger. Although a vassal of the English king, Sir
Hugh had some years before removed himself from England to
Florence, Italy, where he became attached to the Guelphs, a party
that was disputing control of the city with the rival Ghibbelines.
The Guelphs were gratefulfor Sir Hugh's assistance and, after the
Ghibbelines were driven away, ceded him land outside the city
walls on which he constructed his palace. While Sir Hugh was at
the Crusades,the Ghibbilinesthreatenedto retake Florence and the
Guelphs razed the palace to the ground to prevent its tall towers
from being used as vantage points to guide the fire of bombards
againstthe city.

*
David Daniels Allen Distinguished Chair in Law, Vanderbilt Law
School. This comment was prepared with the assistance of a summer research
grant from Vanderbilt Law School.
1.
Edward the First began this crusade in 1270 before he became ing.
He ascended to the throne in 1272 and returned to England in 1274 to rule. He
reigned until 1307.
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Not happy with this course of events but accepting the
unpleasant reality before him, Sir Hugh returned to London where
in 1275 he filed suit against certain Florentine merchants living
there on the then-prevalent theory that citizens of a city or state
could be sued for injuries caused by their municipal government.
The merchants defended by arguing that they could not be called to
account in England for acts done in Florence because that was
wholly a matter for Florentine law. In 1281, the King's Council
ruledfor the merchants,stating:
... lft is not the custom ofErgland that anyone answer in the Kingdom of
Englandfor any trespass made in a region outside ... [Therefore,] the
aforesaid merchants do go without a day. And the aforesaid Hugh to
take nothingby his complain "and to be in mercy... 2

Thus, the court concluded that it had neither judicial nor
prescriptive jurisdiction to try in England any case that arose
abroad.
The lack of utility of the principle enunciated in LaPape
became evident to the English courts almost immediately upon its
promulgation. Human affairs necessarily transcend national
territorial boundaries; yet activities abroad often have important
effects at home. In recognition of this incontrovertible fact,
British courts came to accept as "non-transversablea--not
subject to contradiction-an allegation that the situs of a case
was laid in England, no matter where the cause of action actually
arose, at least when the case involved contracts made abroad to
be performed in England or contracts made in England to be

2.

Hugh LaPape v. Merchants of Florence Living in London, 46 SELDEN

SOCIETY REPORTS: SELECT CASES CONCERNING THE LAW MERCHANT, A.D. 1239-1633,

Vol. I, 34, 38-39 (London, Hubert Hall ed., 1930). The result is based, in part, on
principles of absolute territorial sovereignty and reflects an application of what

some 700 years later came to be called the "vested rights" theory of choice of law.
Elliott Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and Utility, 58
HARV. L. REV. 361, 379-85 (1944). In addition, judicial jurisdiction failed because
the requirement that a "jury"of persons already knowledgeable about the case at
bar be drawn from the shire made it impossible to convene a qualified jury to try
causes of action that originated abroad. William C. Bolland, Introduction, in 39
SELDEN SOCIEnYREPORTS: YEAR BOOKS OF EDWARD II, 7 EDWARD II, A.D. 1313-14, at
xii-xiii (London, William C. Bolland ed., 1992). Furthermore, because to begin a

suit the parties were physically brought before the court by the sheriff (the shire
reeve), the court's jurisdiction was limited by the sheriffs authority, and the
sheriff's authority extended only to the borders of the shire. See Linda J.
Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33, 41-42
(1978).

3.
See Anon., Y.B. 48 Ed. HI Hil. pl. 6, cited in WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, V
A HISTORY OFENGLISH LAW 118. See Dowdale's Case (1606), 6 Co. Rep. 46 (b), 77
ER 323.
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performed abroad. 4 This fictional means of avoiding the strict
territoriality limitations on jurisdiction to prescribe created
considerable concern5 in some English courts until the early
seventeenth century.
It was not until some five hundred years later that Lord
Mansfield ruled that the authority of the British sovereign in his
or her own courts permitted judges to select any law they chose to
resolve the rights of the parties before them.
The act of choosing
6
was itself an exercise of British sovereignty.
The idea that sovereign power is limited by territorial
boundaries is deeply rooted in Anglo-American law. Even before
the rise of the territorial state as the archetypical political unit in
the international community, England, as an island nation,
assumed that its exercise of authority was limited by the
naturally defined territorial boundaries that divided and protected
it from the remainder of the world. It is not, therefore, surprising
that assumed territorial limitations on sovereign power were
fundamental in the common law, even before the rise of territorial7
states on the European continent and in Southeast Asia.
England's geographical condition, together with the natural tribal
and territorial propensities of the human animal, created a strong
psychological climate to support the presumption stated in La
Pape that the efficacy of legal rules is limited to the territory of the
sovereign within whose boundaries relevant events occur or where
relevant persons or things are present. 8
This territorial
presumption accompanied the common law to the United States

to become the cornerstone of the United States system of judicial
9
and prescriptive jurisdiction.
Given this background of strict territoriality in the United
States common law heritage, it is perhaps not surprising that

4.

See HOLDSWORTH, supra note 3, at 117-19.

5.
Id. at 118-20. Similar modifications were made with respect to the
jury system when borough courts might impanel a jury composed one half of
foreigners, or when a commercial transaction had a foreign source. Id. at 104.
6.
Holman v. Johnson, 1 Cowp. 341, 343 (1775). Accord Reich v. Purcell,
432 P. 2d 727, 729 (1967) (Traynor, J.).
7.
See Hessel E. Yntema, The Comity Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1, 18-28
(1966); Harold Maier & Thomas McCoy, A Unifying Theory for JudicialJurisdiction
and Choice of Law, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 249, 260 (1991); Cf. Larry Kramer, Vestiges
ofBeale: ExtraterritorialApplication of American Law, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 179, 208
(1992).
8.
See generally, Peter Nygh, The Territorial Origins of English Law, 2
TASMANIAN L. REV. 28 (1968).
9.
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878); see State v. Knight, 1 N.C.
(Tay.) 1413 (1799); People v. Merrill, 2 Parker's Crim. 590, 596 (N.Y. 1855), rev'd
14 N.Y. 74 (1856).
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conflict of laws courses in the United States tend to omit
discussion or consideration of international choice of law matters.
However, when one considers the preeminent position of the
United States as a world economic power, the constant
interchange of goods, labor, capital, and human beings across
United States borders with other states, and the high degree of
interdependence between the United States economy and that of
the world in general, it is indeed surprising that more attention is
not paid in the general course in conflict of laws to cases and
models drawn from abroad as well as from the interstate system
closer to home.' 0
One reason for this may be that conflicts
scholarship in the United States had for some time assumed that
the same techniques for choice of law that were useful for
interstate cases were also appropriately applied to cases whose
facts invoked international considerations. 1 1 Therefore, little
attention has been directed specifically at problems involving
multistate issues when the states in question are different
nations, instead of different states in the United States.
A civil law lawyer would find it strange that a group of serious
academics would even consider asking the question whether
international conflict of laws issues should be addressed in a
course in conflicts of laws. Throughout most of the world, what
United States law schools call conflict of laws is known as "private
international law" and deals exclusively with international issues.
It is a paradox that academics in the United States, a state whose
federal structure makes it almost impossible to practice law
effectively without some understanding of conflict of laws issues,
should have virtually ignored, for so long, the private
international legal aspects of the field.
Each of the five scholars who have contributed to this written
symposium have emphasized a different aspect of international
conflict of laws that could usefully be considered for inclusion in a
general conflict of laws course in United States law schools. Mr.
Harold Burman, Executive Director of the U.S. Department of
State's Advisory Committee on Private International Law,
identifies the many newly important private international legal
issues that necessarily face lawyers in modern law practice. He
argues that American law graduates are inadequately prepared to
deal with these matters and that courses in conflict of laws must

10.
Professor Friedrich K. Juenger characterizes this situation as the
result of a "tension between sovereignty and mobility." See FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER,
CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE 3 (1993).
11.
Elliott Cheatham & Harold Maier, Private International Law and Its
Sources, 22 VAND. L. REV. 27, 42 (1968); see Armand B. Du Bois, The Significance
in Conflict of Laws of the Distinction between Interstate and International
Transactions,17 MINN. L. REV. 361, 380 (1932).
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make room to consider the important changes that have taken
place in the world's legal environment during the last forty years.
Professor Linda Silberman offers, among other insights, an
illuminating comparison of jurisdictional rules in the European
Community with those in United States law. Professor William
Reynolds discusses the important developments in international
family law matters and asks why these subjects are not part of
conflict of laws courses. Professor Patrick Borchers examines the
relationship between party autonomy in law or forum selection in
international contracts and how decisions on these issues have
changed United States law on these same matters. Professor
Friedrich Juenger discusses the development of a lex mercatoria,a
law governing
business transactions whose development is
divorced from the authority of any particular sovereign state.
These articles are designed not to answer questions, but,
rather, to raise them. Searching for answers must necessarily be
part of law professors' continuing efforts to make the discipline of
conflict of laws relevant both to law school students who will
practice law well into the twenty-first century and to ourselves
who, as conscientious scholars and teachers, will continue to
explore the nuances and vagaries of conflict of laws in the
classroom and on the printed page.

